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Wollongong, New South Wales 2522, Australiabstract. The secure verification is important for watermarking pro-
ocols. A malicious arbitrator is able to remove an original watermark
rom an unauthorized copy of the digital content as a result of a
ecurity breach in the phase of arbitration and resell multiple copies
f it with impunity. We propose a novel buyer-seller watermarking
rotocol of secure verification. In this scheme, a seller permutes an
riginal watermark provided by a trusted Watermarking Certification
uthority (WCA) and embeds it into digital content in an encrypted
omain. In case an unauthorized copy is found, the seller can re-
over the original watermark from the watermark extracted from the
opy and sends it to an arbitrator. Without the knowledge of permu-
ations applied by the seller, the arbitrator is unable to remove the
ermuted watermark from the digital content. Hence, verification is
ecured. As an additional advantage of the proposed protocol, arbi-
ration can be conducted without the need for the cooperation of the
CA or the buyer. © 2007 SPIE and IS&T. DOI: 10.1117/1.2804233
Introduction
igital copyright protection is an important issue in the
evelopment of e-commence. Digital watermarking is a
romising technology for copy protection and copy deter-
ence. A number of digital watermarking algorithms have
een proposed since the introduction of its concept. The
ssential idea behind the technology is to trace piracy by
mbedding watermarks in digital contents. To protect all
arties’ interests in a digital content transaction, a secure
atermarking protocol is desirable in the process of estab-
ishing piracy. A secure watermarking protocol combines
he digital watermarking techniques with cryptography.
Qiao and Nahrstedt1 first pointed out that the customer’s
ight problem exists in the watermarking protocols for trac-
ng piracy. Memon and Wong2 proposed a watermarking
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Downloaded from SPIE Digital Library on 26 Oct 2011 to 128protocol to simultaneously resolve the piracy tracing prob-
lem and the customer’s rights problem. Lei et al.3 ad-
dressed the unbinding problem that exists in Memon and
Wong’s protocol. The secure verification problem is an-
other important issue in the existing watermarking proto-
cols. With the knowledge of a watermark provided by a
seller as undeniable evidence to establish piracy, a mali-
cious arbitrator ARB is able to remove the original wa-
termark from an unauthorized copy and resell multiple cop-
ies of it with impunity. It was expected that asymmetric
watermarking algorithms and watermark zero-knowledge
proofs could resolve the problem.4–7 However, existing
asymmetric watermarking algorithms are not secure enough
and watermark zero-knowledge proof systems are too com-
plex for practical applications.
The work presented in this paper is derived from the
research in Refs. 3 and 8. Lei et al.3 proposed an efficient
and anonymous buyer-seller watermarking protocol that
successfully resolves the unbinding problem. In addition,
during transactions the buyer can remain anonymous via
the help of a trusted Certification Authority CA that is
responsible to issue normal or anonymous digital certifi-
cates. However, this protocol has some drawbacks. First,
the verification is insecure in the protocol. Second, it is not
easy to simultaneously confine the distortion of the digital
content caused by the watermark embedding and ensure the
robustness of the two watermarks. Third, it is not
convenient—and is therefore undesirable—that the coop-
eration of Watermarking Certification Authority WCA is
required in the phase of arbitration. Kuribayashi and
Tanaka8 proposed a new watermarking scheme that embeds
an information bit in the encrypted domain that ensures the
plain value is not exposed. But the protocol that is based on
additive homomorphic property has several issues. First, it
cannot resolve the unbinding problem. Second, the verifi-
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Jation is insecure in the protocol. Third, the use of zero-
nowledge proofs significantly impedes the practicability
f the protocol.
New Watermarking Protocol
he main idea of this paper is to resolve the secure verifi-
ation problem and still retain the advantages of the proto-
ols proposed in Refs. 3 and 8. The goals of the proposed
ew watermarking protocol are as follows:
1. A novel method is proposed to resolve the secure
verification problem, which is much simpler and
more secure than asymmetric watermark algorithms
and watermark zero-knowledge proofs.
2. When an unauthorized copy is found, the seller and
ARB can perform arbitration to establish piracy with-
out the need for the cooperation of WCA or the
buyer. This further enhances the practicability of the
proposed protocol.
3. Only one watermark is embedded in a digital content
and the distortion of a watermarked digital content
can be effectively confined.
Similar to the protocol in Ref. 3, our proposed protocol
s composed of three subprotocols: the registration proto-
ol, the watermarking protocol, and the identification and
rbitration protocol. These subprotocols are described as
ollows.
.1 Registration Protocol
o remain anonymous in transactions, a buyer B randomly
elects a key pair pkB ,skB and sends pkB to CA.3 When
A receives pkB, it generates an anonymous certificate,
ertCApkB, and sends it back to B. Then, as B’s pseud-
nym, pkB will be used in a digital content transaction. It is
ssumed that CA uses the RSA cryptosystem,9 such that the
ey pair pkB ,skB is generated with the RSA algorithm.
If anonymity is not required, B may skip the entire reg-
stration process and use the normal digital certificate.
.2 Watermarking Protocol
or protecting digital copyrights, B, a seller S, and the
CA implement the watermarking protocol, which con-
ists of the following steps. The information is exchanged
mong B, S, and a trusted WCA in the proposed protocol.
igure 1 illustrates the flow of information among them and
he details of a transaction in the protocol.
Step 1. For a transaction, B first negotiates with S to set
p a common agreement ARG, which explicitly states the
ights and obligations of them, and specifies the digital con-
ent X. Note that ARG uniquely binds this particular trans-
ction to X and contains S’s commitment on the quality of
.
Then B randomly selects one public-private key pair
pk* ,sk* according to additive homomorphic encryption
lgorithms, e.g., the Okamota–Uchiyama cryptosystem10
nd the Paillier cryptosystem,11 for this transaction. After
hat, B signs ARG, SignpkBARG, and generates an anony-
ous certificate, CertpkBpk
*. In this case, CA assures the
*egality of pkB, and pkB, in turn, assures the legality of pk .
ournal of Electronic Imaging 043002-
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*, ARG, and
SignpkBARG to S.
Step 2. Upon receiving CertCApkB, CertpkBpk
*, ARG,
and SignpkBARG, S verifies the validity of the certificates
and signature. If any of them is invalid, the transaction is
aborted; otherwise, S sends CertpkBpk
*, ARG, and
SignpkBARG to WCA and requests a valid watermark.
Step 3. When WCA receives CertpkBpk
*, ARG, and
SignpkBARG from S, it verifies the validity of the certifi-
cate and the signature and aborts the transaction if either is
invalid. Otherwise, it generates a watermark W
= w1 ,w2 ,w3 , . . . ,wn specific to this transaction, where wi
 0,1 i 1,n. Then WCA encrypts W with pkB to get
EpkBW using the RSA encryption algorithm, and W with
pk* as Epk*W= Epk*w1 ,Epk*w2 ,Epk*w3 , . . . ,Epk*wn
using an additive homomorphic encryption algorithm, re-
spectively. Finally, WCA computes SignWCAEpkBW , pkB,
SignpkBARG and sends it, Epk*W, and EpkBW back to
S.
Step 4. Upon receiving the response, S randomly gener-
ates an reversible permutation function  of degree n spe-
cific to the digital content X to scramble the elements in
Epk*W to get Epk*W=Epk*W=Epk*W
= Epk*w1 ,Epk*w2 ,Epk*w3 , . . . ,Epk*wn,
2
and per-
forms the watermark insertion in the encrypted domain by
computing Epk*X=Epk*XW=Epk*XEpk*W.
8
Afterwards, S sends Epk*X to B and stores CertCApkB,
ARG, SignpkBARG, , EpkBW, and SignWCAEpkBW,
pkB ,signpkBARG as a new sales record with respect to
the digital content X.
Step 5. Upon receiving Epk*X, B decrypts it with his
private key sk* by computing X=Dsk*Epk*X and ob-
tains the correctly watermarked copy X.
2.3 Identification and Arbitration Protocol
When an unauthorized copy Y of a certain digital content X
is found, the identification and arbitration protocol is used
to trace and establish piracy with undeniable evidences.
S first extracts the watermark W˜ from Y and then
searches the sales records with respect to X for a match
with the condition EpkB
−1W˜ =EpkBW, where 
−1· is
Fig. 1 Information flow and details of a transaction in the proposed
protocol.the reverse permutation function. When a match is found, S
Oct–Dec 2007/Vol. 16(4)2
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Jomputes the original watermark W˜ =−1W˜ . Then S col-
ects the associated information, CertCApkB, ARG,
ignpkBARG, EpkBW, and SignWCAEpkBW , pkB,
ignpkBARG, and sends them with W
˜  to ARB. Upon
eceiving the information from S, ARB verifies the validity
f the certificates, the signature, and EpkBW
˜ =EpkBW. If
ny of them is invalid, ARB rejects the case. Otherwise,
RB requests the real identity behind pkB from CA. Once
he real identity of the buyer who owns pkB is revealed,
RB establishes the piracy against the revealed buyer.
Discussions
n this section, we examine how the design goals are
chieved and analyze the security of the proposed water-
arking protocol.
1. All the design goals set up in Section 2 are accom-
plished by the new watermarking protocol.
• The proposed protocol conveniently resolves the se-
cure verification problem. The original watermark W
as undeniable evidence will be verified by ARB to
establish the piracy against the original B, since S em-
beds the permuted watermark W=W into a digital
content in the encrypted domain. Without S’s permu-
tation function , ARB has no knowledge of W and is
unable to remove it from the unauthorized copy to
resell multiple copies of it with impunity. Obviously,
the method of watermark verification is simpler and
securer than asymmetric watermarking algorithms and
watermark zero-knowledge proofs.
• In the identification and arbitration phase, the coopera-
tion of the WCA or B is not required. S extracts the
watermark W˜ from the unauthorized copy and collects
the associated information. Then the seller computes
W˜ =−1W˜  using a reverse permutation function and
sends it to ARB. ARB will verify EpkBW
˜ =EpkBW
and establish the piracy against B, who owns the pub-
lic key pkB.
• In the proposed protocol, only one watermark is em-
bedded in a digital content. When an unauthorized
copy of a digital content X is found, S first extracts a
watermark W˜ from it and then searches the sales
records with respect to X for a match with the condi-
tion EpkB
−1W˜ =EpkBW. When a match is found,
S collects the associated information and sends it with
W˜ =−1W˜  to ARB. The watermark V for identifying
the malicious B in the watermarking protocols given
in Refs. 2 and 3 is not necessary in our proposed pro-
tocol. Furthermore, the distortion of the watermarked
digital content caused by watermark embedding can
be effectively confined using Kuribayashi and
Tanaka’s8 watermark embedding method.
2. The proposed watermarking protocol can also ad-
dress the following security issues.
• For the piracy tracing problem, because B has no
knowledge of the original digital content X and the
ournal of Electronic Imaging 043002-
Downloaded from SPIE Digital Library on 26 Oct 2011 to 128permuted watermark W, B is unable to remove
W from a watermarked digital content X. In addi-
tion, the proposed protocol provides a mechanism to
unambiguously identify the malicious B once an un-
authorized copy originated from B is found.
• For the customer’s right problem, because S does not
know the watermark W, S cannot produce a water-
marked copy to frame B, since S gets no access to the
watermarked copy of the digital content in its final
form.
• For the unbinding problem, because the signature
SignWCAEpkBW , pkB ,signpkBARG explicitly binds
W to ARG, which uniquely specifies a particular digi-
tal content X, it is impossible for S to transplant the
watermark into another copy of a higher-priced digital
content.
• For the anonymity problem, similar to the protocol of
Lei et al.,3 the anonymity of B can be retained during
the transaction with the assistance of CA unless ARB
adjudges B to be guilty of piracy.
3. Considering the tradeoff between the robustness and
the capacity, in the protocol by Kuribayashi and
Tanaka8 proposed, the watermark information has 32
bits. In our protocol, in order to prevent S from easily
guessing the watermark W according to EpkBW, the
length of W should be large enough, e.g., 512. We can
improve both the robustness and the capacity of the
watermark using the image-adaptive data hiding
method given in Ref. 12. By the way, since the addi-
tive homomorphic encryption algorithms, such as the
Okamota–Uchiyama cryptosystem10 and the Paillier
cryptosystem,11 are random encryption algorithms, S
is unable to guess the information bit according to
Epk*wi, i 1,n.
4. B and S need to exchange information only once in
our proposed protocol. B first sends a purchase order
including CertCApkB, CertpkBpk
*, ARG, and
SignpkBARG to S, and then S sends the encrypted
watermarked digital content Epk*X back to B. In a
digital content transaction, B is not required to con-
tact anyone else except S.3 To get a digital content, B
contacts S and provides the necessary information to
S. Upon receiving the purchase order from B, S pro-
duces a watermarked digital content and delivers it to
B, which completes the simple buyer-seller collabo-
ration cycle.
5. Compared to Lei et al.’s protocol3 and Kuribayashi
and Tanaka’s protocol,8 the protocol proposed in this
paper is securer and simpler. In addition, the amount
of data transmitted is reduced and the practicability is
improved. Our proposed protocol is well suitable for
practical applications.
4 Conclusions
This paper proposed a watermarking protocol of secure
verification based on PKI. A number of improvements are
achieved over recent protocols in Section 3, which include
the following:1. A novel method is proposed to resolve the secure
Oct–Dec 2007/Vol. 16(4)3
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Jverification problem, which is much simpler and se-
curer than asymmetric watermarking algorithms and
watermark zero-knowledge proofs.
2. ARB can determine whether the buyer produces the
unauthorized copy according to the information pro-
vided by the seller without the need for the coopera-
tion of the WCA or the buyer.
3. Only one watermark is embedded in a digital content,
and the distortion of a watermarked digital content
can be effectively confined.
4. The proposed protocol can also address the security
problems in protocols discussed in Section 3. As a
result, it is well suitable for practical applications.
Because the security of the watermarking protocols
ighly depends on the security and robustness of the under-
ying watermarking algorithms, our future work will in-
lude development of better watermarking algorithms that
an operate in an encrypted domain.
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